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Harper Collins, New York. Morgan Stanley Research The mobile Internet report. Morgan Stanley, New York. Enlarge cover. Error rating book. Refresh and try again. Open Preview See a Problem? Philip Grime.
Details if other :. Thanks for telling us about the problem. Return to Book Page. Philip Grime ,. Simon Pierce. Get A Copy. Kindle Edition , pages. Published March 26th by Wiley-Blackwell first published March 22nd More Details Other Editions 7. Friend Reviews. To see what your friends thought of this book, please sign up. The numerical simulations in 4. For the cooperative enterprises, the larger its distribution coefficient, the more willing they are to cooperate with the port enterprise, which is at the core of the ecosystem.
In the process of operation and management, port enterprises should not only ensure their interests but also should consider the interests of their cooperative enterprises. The members of the ecosystems pursue the maximisation of their interests, and the unfair distribution of interests will lead to the disorder and even disintegration of the systems. All enterprises create values for the PBE. Only by creating value, one can attract participants to the ecosystem, and only these values can keep participants.
In the process of collaborative development, the PBE realises value sharing and needs to construct a reasonable benefit-sharing mechanism to encourage enterprises to provide better and faster port, shipping, and logistics services, which is the core of ensuring the healthy development of the PBE.
By introducing a punishment mechanism, it is possible to change the cooperative enterprise from the non-collaboration to collaboration. Similarly, introducing a reward mechanism will be helpful for enterprises to choose the collaboration strategy instead of opportunism and improve the stability of the PBE.
The initial strategy choice of either party will affect the strategy choice of the other party in the PBE. Trust is a lubricant and binder for the co-evolution of the PBE, and it is one of the several guarantee mechanisms for the stable operation of PBE.
Enterprises should consciously increase their trust in each other, effectively reduce supervision costs and default risks, and promote the healthy and long-term development of the PBE. The establishment of a trust mechanism can be divided into pre-event, in-process and post-event.
The port enterprise must carefully select partners based on multiple criteria. Choosing a trusted logistics enterprise to cooperate is a means to reduce the risk of cooperation beforehand, which can also reduce the probability of opportunistic behaviour in cooperation.
In the process of cooperation, the port enterprise should strengthen the supervision of the other logistics enterprises to ensure collaboration. If the cooperative enterprise adopts opportunism, the port enterprise can use the PBE information platform to inform other members of the opportunistic behaviour of the defaulting enterprise. All members can impose team sanctions on companies that engage in opportunistic behaviour or even drive them out of the PBE. The asymmetry of information between the game subjects and the instability of the trust relationship bring opportunities for the creation of speculative behaviour.
Ports, as important nodes in the logistics and supply chain, naturally gather much information. The platform of the PBE can combine ports, cargo owners, shipping companies, logistics companies, service organisations and other members effectively to accelerate the deep integration of logistics, information and trade, which is conducive to the more convenient matching of logistics supply and demand and the PBE to provide more efficient port logistics services.
The construction of the information platform also contributes to promoting the sharing of information resources, prompting system members to form a good trust relationship, improving the convenience of cooperation, and reducing the cost of collaboration. The construction and improvement of the ecosystem information platform can circumvent the influence of the traditional system on system efficiency to a certain extent, and improve the fluency of information flow, capital flow, material flow and energy flow inside and outside the PBE.
This paper studies the evolution process of the PBE by using evolutionary game theory. The results show that the evolution results of the system are influenced by the initial state of the system, the cooperative cost, the distribution coefficient, and the penalty. In order to ensure the healthy development of the PBE, port enterprises, as the core of the ecosystem, should play a leading role and establish a reasonable benefit distribution mechanism, punishment mechanism and trust mechanism together with other members of the ecosystem.
Meanwhile, they should attach great importance to the construction and improvement of the PBE platform. Apart from that, the research model of this paper is put forward based on some assumptions. The actual cases have not been analysed in this paper, which need to be further studied in future research. Finally, the political environment, macro-economic environment, social environment and natural environment issues can be incorporated in an extension of the model for future research.
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